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We consider the problem of secure key distribution among n trustful agents: the goal is to
distribute an identical random bit-string among the n agents over a noisy channel such that eaves-
droppers learn little about it. We study the general situation where the only resources required are
secure bipartite key distribution and authenticated classical communication. Accordingly, multipar-
tite quantum key distribution can be proven unconditionally secure by reducing the problem to the
biparitite case and invoking the proof of security of bipartite quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing use of the internet and other forms of electronic communication, the question of secure com-
munication becomes one of considerable importance. Modern cryptographic techniques, based on the availability
of ever increasing computational power, and the invention of public key cryptography, provide practical solutions
for information security in various situations. But invariably these techniques are only computationally– and not
unconditionally– secure, that is, they depend on the (unproven) hardness of certain mathematical problems. As a
result, it cannot be guaranteed that future advances in computational power will not nullify their cryptographic pro-
tection. Nevertheless, there does exist a form of encryption with unconditional security: the use of one-time key pads.
These are strings of random numbers added by the information sender to encode the message, to be subtracted by the
receiver to decode. Provided that the key material is truely random and used only once, this system is unbreakable
in the sense described by Shannon in the 1940s [1]. It is critically important that the pad is only used once, i.e., an
encryption key can never be used twice. This restriction translates into the practical one of key distribution (KD).
This need to securely distribute the key between the users makes it impractical in many applications. Where it is used
in real life (eg., in confidential communications between governments), the one-time key pads are actually delivered
in person by some trusted third party [2], an arrangement prohibitively expensive for common usage and moreover not
truely secure. Fortunately, recent advances in quantum information theory have shown that unconditionally secure
key distribution is possible in principle.
That quantum information can, on account of quantum uncertainty and the no-cloning principle [3], be used to
distribute cryptographic keys was realized two decades ago [4, 5]. More rigorous and comprehensive proofs of this
task, generally called quantum key distribution (QKD), taking into consideration source, device and channel noise as
well as an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper, have been studied by various authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Recently, the issues
of efficiency [11], security in the presence of an uncharacterized source [12] and high bit-error rate tolerance [13] of
QKD have been considered. In particular, Lo and Chau [8] showed that, given fault-tolerant quantum computers,
quantum key distribution over an arbitrarily long distance of a realistically noisy channel can be made unconditionally
secure. This is a heartening development, since QKD is, among quantum information applications, relatively easy to
implement, and some large scale implementations have already been achieved [14, 15]. The above mentioned works
consider QKD between two parties (ie., 2-QKD). It is of interest to consider its extension to more than two parties
(ie., n-QKD).
The problem of n-QKD is to determine how n parties, who are able to communicate quantally, may share an identical
and unconditionally secure, secret key among themselves in the presence of eavesdroppers. (A different generalization
of 2-QKD gives multipartite quantum secret-sharing [16], which we do not consider here). In this work, we propose
a protocol for this purpose and prove its unconditional security. We note that a simple extrapolation of 2-QKD to
n-QKD would suggest that the agents should begin by sharing an n-partite entangled state. However, this proposition
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2suffers from two drawbacks: from a practical viewpoint, preparing n-partite entanglement is no easy task; from a
theoretical viewpoint, proving the security of secure extraction of n separated copies of a bit-string may not be simple,
even given the existing proof of security of the bipartite case. Our main result is that it is sufficient if some pairs of
agents share bipartite entanglement along any spanning tree connecting the n agents, who are taken to be vertices on
a graph. In this way, n-QKD is reduced to a 2-QKD problem. Existing 2-QKD protocols [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
can be invoked to prove the unconditional security of sharing nearly perfect Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs
between two parties. They prescribe procedures for reliably sharing EPR pairs, and thence sharing randomness, by
virtue of fault-tolerant quantum computers, quantum error correction and suitable random sampling. In the interests
of brevity, we will not elaborate these protocols here, and only point them out as subroutines for the general n-QKD
task. Our protocol is fairly simple in the sense that the proof of its security is built on top of the already proven
security of the bipartite case. However, it is important to know the necessary and sufficient conditions on the network
topology for our proposed protocol to work.
II. CLASSICAL REDUCTION OF n-KD TO 2-KD
As in 2-KD, the goal of n-KD is to show that n trustful parties can securely share random, secret classical bits,
even in the presence of noise and eavesdropping. It is assumed that the n agents can share authenticated classical
communication. It is convenient to treat the problem graph theoretically [17]. The n agents Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are
considered as the vertices (or nodes) of an undirected graph. An instance of a secure bi-partite channel being shared
between two parties is considered as an undirected edge between the two corresponding vertices. A graph so formed
is called a security graph. It is obvious that if the security graph has a star topology (a hub vertex with all edges
radiating from it to the other vertices), a simple n-KD protocol can be established. The agent at the hub vertex (say,
called, Lucy) generates a random bit string and transmits it to every other agent along the edges to each of them.
This will create a secure, identical random bit string with each agent.
In real life situations, because of practical and geographical constraints, the n agents may not form a security graph
with star topology. We describe a simple protocol that allows for more general secure bi-partite connectivity between
the agents. In particular, from among the secure bipartite channels suppose a spanning tree (a graph connecting all
vertices without forming a loop) can be constructed. This construction can be formalized in order to determine an
optimal spanning tree. Some useful definitions are given below.
Weighted security graph: Given n parties treated as nodes on a graph, we extend the definition of a security graph
to the weighted security graph. A weight is associated with every edge and is defined to be some suitable measure of
the cost of communicating by means of the channel corresponding to the edge.
Minimum spanning security tree: Consider the weighted security graph G = (V,E). A spanning tree selected from
G, given by G1 = (V,E1), E1 ⊆ E is called the minimum spanning security tree if it minimizes the total weight
of the graph. It need not be unique and can be obtained using Kruskal’s or Prim’s algorithm [18]. The minimum
spanning security tree minimizes the resources needed in the protocol as well as the size of the sector eavesdroppers
can potentially control.
Terminal agent: An agent that corresponds to a vertex of degree one (ie., with exactly one edge linked to it). On
the other hand, an agent that corresponds to a vertex of degree greater than one is called a non-terminal agent.
We now present a classical subroutine that allows n − 1 pair-wise shared random bits to be turned into a single
random bit shared between the n parties.
1. 2-KD: Along the n − 1 edges of a minimum spanning security tree, n − 1 random bits are securely shared by
means of some secure 2-KD protocol.
2. Each non-terminal agent Ai announces his unformly randomized record: this is the list of edges emanating from
the vertex along with the corresponding random bit values, to all of which a fixed random bit x(i) is added.
3. This information is sufficient to allow every player, in conjunction with her/his own random bit record, to
reconstruct the random bits of all parties. The protocol leader (say, Lucy) decides randomly on the terminal
agent whose random bit will serve as the secret bit shared among the n agents.
This subroutine consumes n − 1 pair-wise shared random numbers to give a one-bit secret key shared amongst the
n-parties. To generate an m-bit string shared among the n agents, the subroutine is repeated m times.
Given that the initial bipartite sharing of randomness is secure, we will show that the above protocol subroutine
allows some randomness to be shared between the n agents without revealing anything to an eavesdropper. It involves
each non-terminal agent announcing his uniformly randomized record. Suppose one such, Ai, has the random record
0,1,1 on the three edges linked to his vertex. He may announce 0,1,1 (for x(i) = 0) or 1,0,0 (for x(i) = 1). All
3the three agents linked to him can determine which the correct string is by referring to their shared secret bit.
It is a straightforward exercise to see that each of other agents linked to these three can determine the right bit
string. Therefore, each agent can determine the random bits of all others. Eavesdroppers, on the other hand, lacking
knowledge of any of the n− 1 shared random bits, can only work out the relative outcomes of all parties. The result
is exactly two possible configurations for each secret bit, which are complements of each other. The eavesdropper
“Eve” is thus maximally uncertain about which the correct configuration is. Hence, Lucy’s choice of a party to fix
the secret bit reveals little to Eve. Insofar as the n-parties are able to communicate authenticated classical messages,
the subroutine protocol is as secure as the underlying procedure for 2-KD.
It is obvious that the above protocol works for any spanning security tree. Clearly, a sufficient condition for turning
shared bipartite randomness into randomness shared between n parties is that the weighted security graph should
contain at least one spanning tree. On the other hand, if the security graph is disconnected, one easily checks that it
is impossible to arrive at a definite random bit securely shared between both the disconnected pieces. Therefore, the
existence of at least one spanning tree in the weighted security graph is both a necessary and sufficient condition for
the required task.
The amount of securely shared randomness may be quantified by the length of shared random bit string multiplied
by the number of sharing agents. In the above protocol, the n − 1 instances of pair-wise shared randomness is
consumed to produce exactly one instance of a random bit shared between the n parties. We can then define the
‘random efficiency’ of the above protocol by η = (n× 1)/((n− 1)× 2), which tends to (1/2) as n→∞. Unconditional
security of the above subroutine can in principle only be guaranteed in a protocol which includes in step 1 a quantum
sub-routine that implements 2-QKD. In the following Section, we will present one such, based on the Shor-Preskill
protocols [10], as an example.
III. QUANTUM PROTOCOL
As in 2-QKD, the goal of the proposed n-QKD protocol is to show that n trustful parties can securely distil random,
shared, secret classical bits, whose security is to be proven inspite of source, device and channel noise and of Eve,
an eavesdropper assumed to be as powerful as possible, and in particular, having control over all communication
channels. From the result of the preceding Section, it follows that a quantum protocol is needed only in step 1 above.
It will involve establishing 2-QKD along a minimum spanning tree in order to securely share pair-wise randomness
along spanning tree’s edges and thence proceed to n-QKD. We assume as given the security of establishing pair-wise
randomness along a spanning tree by means of a quantum communication network, based on a secure 2-QKD protocol
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. In principle, these protocols guarantee security under various circumstances.
In an n-QKD scheme, the insecurity of even one of the players can undermine all. Hence additional classical
processing like key reconciliation and privacy amplification [19] of the final key may be needed at the n-partite level.
In the full n-QKD protocol that we present below, following Ref. [10] we exploit the connection of error correction
codes [20] with key reconciliation and privacy amplification. These procedures have been extensively studied by
classical cryptographers [14], and other possibilities exist.
In particular, we adopt a quantum protocol wherein pair-wise randomness is created by means of sharing EPR pairs
(this follows the pattern set by the Ekert [5], Lo-Chau [8] and Modified Lo-Chau [10] protocols, but entanglement is
not necessary, as seen in the original BB84 protocol). The basic graph theoretic definitions introduced above apply
also for the quantum case, except that now the security channels correspond to shared EPR pairs. In place of a secure
bipartite channel, an instance of EPR pair shared between two parties is considered as an undirected edge between
the two corresponding vertices. A graph so formed is called an EPR graph [17]. The analog of the weighted security
graph is the weighted EPR graph, and that of the minimum spanning security tree is the minimum spanning EPR tree.
Let us enumerate the n parties as A1, A2, · · · , An. Suppose that only Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ais (i1, i2, · · · , is ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n})
are capable of producing EPR pairs and S ≡ {Ai1 , · · · , Ais} is the set of all such vertices, with S 6= ∅. We construct
a weighted undirected graph G = (V,E) as one whose every edge must contain a vertex drawn from the set S, as
follows: V ≡ {Ai; i = 1, 2, · · · , n} and E ≡ {(Ai, Aj) ∀ Ai ∈ S and ∀ Aj ∈ V ; i 6= j}. And the weight of edge
(Ai, Aj) is defined to be wi,j ∝ number of quantum repeaters [21] (more generally: entanglement distilling resources
[22]) required to be put between Ai and Aj . Usually, the larger the distance between two agents, the larger is the
weight. The minimum spanning EPR tree minimizes the number of quantum repeators needed, and, in general, the
resources needed in the protocol (EPR pairs, etc.) subject to the constraint of available EPR sources. Apart from
improving efficiency in terms of costs incurred, this optimization is also important from the security perspective in
that it minimizes the size of the sector that Eve can potentially control.
Let C be a classical t-error correcting [m, k]-code [20]. We now present a protocol that consumes n − 1 pair-wise
securely shared sets of EPR pairs to create random bits shared between the n parties with asymptotic efficiency
η = (1/2)k/m, where k/m is the rate of the code. The classical subroutine described in the previous Section is
4adapted to include key reconciliation and privacy amplification at the n-partite level, that uses the group theoretic
properties of C.
1. EPR protocol: Along the n− 1 edges of the minimum spanning EPR tree, EPR pairs are shared (using eg., the
Lo-Chau [8] or Modified Lo-Chau protocols [10]). Let the final, minimum number of EPR pairs distilled along
any edge of the minimum spanning EPR tree be 2m. A projective measurement in the computational basis is
performed by all the parties on their respective qubits to obtain secure pair-wise shared randomness along the
tree edges (making due adjustments according to whether the entangled spins are correlated or anti-correlated).
2. Classical subroutine of Section II: All non-terminal vertices announce their unformly randomized outcome record.
This information in principle allows every party, in conjunction with her/his outcome, to reconstruct the out-
comes of all other parties, save for some errors of mismatch.
3. For each set of n − 1 shared EPR pairs, protocol leader Lucy decides randomly on the terminal party whose
outcome will serve as the secret bit.
4. Lucy decides randomly a set of m bits to be used as check bits, and announces their positions.
5. All parties announce the value of their check bits. If too few of these values agree, they abort the protocol.
6. Lucy broadcasts ci ⊕ v, where v is the string consisting of the remaining code (non-check) bits, and ci is a
random codeword in C.
7. Each member j from amongst the remaining n− 1 parties subtracts ci ⊕ v from his respective code bits, v⊕ ǫj ,
and corrects the result, ci ⊕ ǫj , to a codeword in C. Here ǫj is a possibly non-vanishing error-vector.
8. The parties use i as the key.
A rigorous proof of the security of the n-QKD scheme requires: (a) the explicit construction of a procedure such
that whenever Eve’s strategy has a non-negligible probability of passing the verification test by the n parties, her
information on the final key will be exponentially small. (b) the shared, secret randomness is robust against source,
device and channel noise. By construction, our scheme combines a 2-QKD scheme to generate pair-wise shared
randomness and a classical scheme to turn this into multipartite-shared randomness. The security of the latter (in its
essential form) was proven in Section II. Therefore the security of the protocol with respect to (a) and (b) reduces
to that of the 2-QKD in step 1. For various situations, 2-QKD can be secured, as proven in Refs [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
For example, Lo and Chau [8] and Shor and Preskill [10] have proved that EPR pairs can be prepared to be nearly
perfect, even in the presence of Eve and channel noise. Their proofs essentially relies on the idea that sampling the
coherence of the qubits allows one to place an upper bound on the effects due to noise and information leakage to
Eve. Yet, subject to the availability of high quality quantum repeaters and fault-tolerant quantum computation, in
principle 2-QKD can be made unconditionally secure [8].
In regard to the key reconciliation part: in step (3), each non-terminal vertex party announces his uniformly
randomized outcome record. Here this consumes m instances of n − 1 pair-wise shared random bits into k
random bits shared between the n agents while revealing little to Eve. The random efficiency is given by
η = (k × n× 1)/(m× (n− 1)× 2), which tends to (1/2)k/m as n → ∞. The check bits, whose positions and values
are announced in steps (4) and (5), are eventually discarded. Steps (7) and (8) involve purely local, classical operations
[23]. If security of step (1) against Eve is guaranteed, the string v, and thereby the string ci ⊕ v announced by Lucy
in step (6), are completely random, as far as Eve can say. So, she (Eve) gains nothing therefrom. Hence her mutual
information with any of the n− 1 (sets of) random bits does not increase beyond what she has at the end of the EPR
protocol [24].
Finally, step (5) permits with high probability to determine whether the key can be reconciled amongst the n
players. The check bits that the parties measure behave like a classical random sample of bits [10]. We can then
use the measured error rates in a classical probability estimate. For any two parties, the probability of obtaining
more than (δ + ǫ)n errors on the code bits and fewer than δn errors on the check bits is asymptotically less than
exp[−0.25ǫ2n/(δ−δ2)]. Noting that the errors on the n check vectors are independent, it follows that probability that
the check vectors are all scattered within a ball of radius δn but one or more code vectors fall outside a scatter ball of
radius (δ+ ǫ)n is exponentially small, and can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently small δ. The decision
criterion adopted in step (5) is calculated so that the Hamming weight of the error vectors ǫj estimated in the above
fashion will be less than t with high probability. Hence all parties correct their results to the same codeword ci in
step (8) with high probability. This completes the proof of unconditionally security of n-QKD.
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